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Associative learning has provided fundamental insights to understanding psychopathology.
However, psychopathology occurs along a continuum and as such, identification
of disruptions in processes of associative learning associated with aspects of
psychopathology illustrates a general flexibility in human associative learning. A handful
of studies have looked specifically at individual differences in human associative learning,
but while much work has concentrated on accounting for flexibility in learning caused by
external factors, there has been limited work considering how to model the influence of
dispositional factors. This review looks at the range of individual differences in human
associative learning that have been explored and the attempts to account for, and model,
this flexibility. To fully understand human associative learning, further research needs to
attend to the causes of variation in human learning.
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Research into individual differences across the human popu-
lation has contributed to better understanding of everything
from academic achievement to crime and delinquency, from
income and poverty to health (Lubinski, 2000). Studying indi-
vidual difference in human learning has contributed to our
understanding of the mechanisms underlying psychopathology,
particularly because learning identifies a process and therefore
a mechanism by which individuals might differ. As traits of
psychopathology vary across the population, our understand-
ing of the association between psychopathology and disruptions
in processes of association learning, may tell us a considerable
amount about the nature and extent of variation in human asso-
ciative learning. While evidence that people do not all learn
the same way has been used to help us understand aspects
of psychopathology, this exploration of flexibility in human
learning needs to be integrated into our general understanding
of the mechanisms of learning so that models can accommo-
date the factors that produce variance in learning. To exam-
ine individual difference in all aspects of associative learning
would be too board a scope for this review. To provide focus
to analysis of individual differences, this paper addresses vari-
ation in learning about combinations of stimuli. Specifically,
this review presents a range of examples demonstrating indi-
vidual differences in the selectivity of learning and tendency to
learn about individual elements or configurations and consid-
ers how models of associative learning can accommodate this
variation.
Associative learning theorists understand behavior by studying
how associations between stimulus representations are acquired
and used. Much of this work considers which factors influence
learning and how these factors exert influence. The basic model
of error prediction learning, shown in Equation (1) provides
us with an indication of several factors that might influence
learning. This equation was described by Rescorla and Wagner
(1972).
Vn = αn × β× (λ− V) (1)
This equation describes change in associative strength of a stim-
ulus (Vn) as a function of prediction error; that is, the dis-
crepancy between the outcome expected following the given
stimulus and the outcome that actually occurs. Prediction error
is given by the difference between the asymptote of learning
(λ), the total associative strength that the unconditioned stim-
ulus (US) can support, and the current associative strength
of all stimuli present on the trial. Prediction error is mul-
tiplied by the salience or intensity of that stimulus (α) and
the US (β).
To provide some examples, research has considered how
stimulus representations might differ on the basis of intensity
and/or salience (i.e., α) and how such differences influence learn-
ing (Perkins, 1953; Logan, 1954; Redhead and Pearce, 1995).
There has also been much consideration how attention shifts
between different stimuli to influence learning (Mackintosh,
1975; Pearce and Hall, 1980; Le Pelley and McLaren, 2004; de
Wit and Dickinson, 2009; Harris and Livesey, 2010; Lubow, 2010;
McLaren et al., 2010) and how previous experiences can modify
the acquisition of new stimulus representations and their associ-
ations (Kamin, 1968; Seligman, 1972; Lubow et al., 1976). This
review considers whether these factors are constant across the
population, or whether the influence these factors have upon
learning varies between individuals. As much of the research test-
ing individual difference in human associative learning relates
to psychopathology, this review relies heavily upon illustra-
tions from clinically focused research. The studies discussed here
demonstrate substantive individual differences in central aspects
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of associative learning. The review concludes with a brief look at
how models of associative learning can account for the observed
individual differences.
STIMULUS SALIENCE AND SELECTIVE PREDICTION ERROR
Individual difference in terms of what is perceived to be salient
may influence the acquisition of associations. The strength with
which associative learning occurs tends to increase with stimu-
lus salience (Kamin and Brimer, 1963; Kamin and Schaub, 1963).
For instance, if two stimuli of different salience co-occur, stronger
stimulus-outcome associations should be acquired for the more
salient stimulus (Kamin, 1969; Mackintosh, 1971). Similarly, the
strength of associative learning has been related to the strength
of the unconditioned stimulus (US; Pavlov, 1927). For example,
conditioned responding to shock in rabbits was observed to be
directly related to the intensity of the shock, the US (Smith, 1968).
To summarize with a relative simple example; a child playing with
a toy may learn that pressing a lever on the toy causes a light
to turn on. The perceived intensity or salience of the light (the
outcome of the behavior) will influence the associative strength
that can be supported. The perceived kinaesthetic experience of
handling the leaver (the intensity or salience of the stimulus) will
also influence the strength of learning. Variation in terms of what
individuals find salient should have a substantial impact upon the
acquisition of associations and may, for example, contribute to
differences in associative learning in depression and anxiety.
Depression is associated with a tendency to find certain nega-
tive information salient (Matthews et al., 1995; Mogg et al., 1995;
Bradley et al., 1997; Rusting, 1998, 1999; Gotlib et al., 2004; Chan
et al., 2007; Phillips et al., 2010). This should have an impact
upon the associations learned. Learning with salient stimuli will
occur at the expense of less salient stimuli (Mackintosh, 1971). As
such, if individuals with, or at risk of developing, depression find
negative information more salient, they should be more likely to
learn associations with negative stimuli as opposed to positive or
neutral stimuli.
When learning occurs, the strength of learning that can be
supported is dependent upon the strength of the outcome, or
unconditioned stimulus (i.e., Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). As in
the example of the child playingwith a toy, the association formed
between pressing the leaver and the occurrence of the outcome,
the light turning on, may be influenced by how bright the light is,
but also by how much lights interest the child. If the child’s inter-
est in lights is minimal, we may suggest that the perceived salience
of the light, for that child, is limited. In which case, the strength
of learning that the lightmay support should be limited. Applying
this logic to individuals with depression, we may consider that the
tendency to find negative information more salient may increase
the perceived salience of negative outcomes. This should facilitate
negative outcomes to support stronger acquisition of associa-
tive strength. This may, for instance, result in individuals with
depression forming stronger associations between stimuli and
negative outcomes, facilitating subsequent negative expectations.
As such, the tendency to find negative information more salient
may perpetuate expectation of unfavorable outcomes.
Aspects of fear conditioning associated with anxiety may
be characterized by similar differences in stimulus perception.
Enhanced fear conditioning is suggested to play an important role
in anxiety disorders (Craske et al., 2006; Mineka and Zinbarg,
2006). Variation in the perceived intensity of a fearful stimulus is
one factor that may account for differences in the ease with which
fear associations are learned or maintained (Otto et al., 2007).
For instance, participants’ ratings of the aversiveness of a US have
been observed to correlate significantly with ability to learn to dis-
sociate a stimulus (CS) paired with the aversive US from a CS not
paired with the US (Joos et al., 2013).
The salience of a stimulus, however, is not fixed. Stimulus
salience may change with experience (Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce
and Hall, 1980; Le Pelley and McLaren, 2004; Le Pelley et al.,
2010; Pearce and Mackintosh, 2010). Learning arguably occurs
more readily with stimuli that are good predictors of an out-
come while stimuli that are poor predictors of an outcome lose
ability to capture attention (Mackintosh, 1975). Research into
mechanisms of associative learning which may underpin symp-
toms of schizophrenia provide examples of individual difference
in changes of stimulus salience over training.
Normally, repeated presentation of a stimulus uncorrelated
with an outcome retards subsequent ability to learn about that
stimulus (Lubow and Moore, 1959; Lubow et al., 1976; Lubow,
2010). This effect has been termed latent inhibition. One expla-
nation for this effect is that repeated exposure to the stimulus
reduces the salience of the stimulus, specifically affecting the
attentional associability of the stimulus such that the weight of
attention afforded to the stimlus is reduced relative to other
stimuli (Mackintosh, 1975; Le Pelley, 2004). As attentional asso-
ciatibility will determine which stimulus should have access to
learning and which should not (Mackintosh, 1975; Le Pelley,
2004), a reduction in attentional associability should reduce
learning.
This process of latent inhibition is disrupted in schizophre-
nia and this disruption is associated with negative symptoms of
schizophrenia in particular (Lubow et al., 1976; Baruch et al.,
1988; Lubow, 1989, 2010; Gray et al., 1995; Vaitl and Lipp,
1997; Rascle et al., 2001; Gal et al., 2009). In contrast, persis-
tent latent inhibition, that is, abnormally strong processes of
latent inhibition, have been observed in animal models of posi-
tive symptoms of schizophrenia (Weiner, 2003). In contrast to the
wealth of research exploring disrupted latent inhibition in human
partcipants, there has been limited work exploring the effect of
persistent latent inhibition in the human population. Further
research would be beneficial to help understand whether mech-
anisms of associative learning have relevance for understanding
positive symptoms of schizophrenia. The disruption of latent
inhibition assocaited with negative symptoms of schizophrenia,
however, suggests that negative symptoms are associated with a
deficit in selective attention (Solomon et al., 1981; Weiner et al.,
1981, 1984) or selective prediction error (Haselgrove and Evans,
2010).
Haselgrove and Evans (2010) have used the blocking effect
to further explore the relationship between selective prediction
error and schizophrenia. Blocking is thought to be dependent
upon selective prediction error. Kamin (1968, 1969) observed
that prior training with one stimulus interferes with the acqui-
sition of of associative strength with a second stimulus when
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presented in compoud with the initial stimulus. For instance if
a stimulus is paired with an outcome (A+) prior to pairing two
stimuli with the same outcome (AX+), the associative strength
acquired by the second stimulus (X) is reduced compared to a
control. Selective prediction error is argued to underlie this effect
(Haselgrove and Evans, 2010). The Rescorla and Wagner model
of learning, described above in Equation 1, uses a summed error
term and predicts that change in the associative strength of a
stimulus depends upon the difference between the asymptopte of
learning supported by the outcome and the associative strength of
all stimuli present on a trial. For example, on the AX compound
trial, A already predcits the outcome and therefore the prediction
error is minmal, preventing learning with X. A failure to show
blocking may suggest that prediction error is non-selective, that
is, on the AX compound trial the associative strength acquired by
A is not considered when learningwith X and hence learningwith
X can occur (Haselgrove and Evans, 2010).
Blocking is disrupted in schizophrenia; this disruption is asso-
ciated with the negative and depressive symptoms of schizophre-
nia in particular (Bender et al., 2001; Moran et al., 2008). This
effect has been replicated in a non-clinical sample; individuals
with high levels of introverted anhedonia, the negative symptom
dimension of schizotypy, show disrupted blocking (Haselgrove
and Evans, 2010). Observation of this effect with the dimension of
schizotypy suggests that across the general population individuals
differ considerably in the selectivity of their learning.
ATTENDING TO THE CUES OR THE CONTEXT
In an associative learning paradigm participants are usually given
the opportunity to learn that a stimulus predicts an outcome.
Specificity is a fundamental component of this learning. That is to
say, learning that a specific stimulus, and not the context in which
that stimulus is presented or any other presented stimuli, predicts
that the outcome of interest. To return to the original example of
a child playing with a toy; pressing the leaver causes a light to turn
on. In playing with the toy the child has the opportunity to expe-
rience the contingency of leaver pressing and the occurrence of
the light. Experience of this contingency should facilitate learning
that a specific cue, pressing the leaver, rather than any other cue
in the environment, causes the light to turn on.
One explanation for the relationship between anxiety and high
levels of conditioned fear may be a deficit in specificity of learn-
ing (Baas et al., 2008; Baas, 2013). For example, if an aversive
stimulus (US) is presented in a given context, it is likely that that
context will be associated with that US and thus the context may
begin to evoke a fear response. If the aversive US is always, and
only, presented immediately after a specific cue, the cue can be
used to predict the aversive US. Learning the specific association
between the cue and US should reduce the association between
the context and the aversive US, as the context is a less reliable
predictor of the US than the cue. Failure to learn this specific asso-
ciation may be expected to result in continued general fear of the
context. Studies have identified a relationship between learning a
specific association between a threat cue and an aversive US and
a reduction in general fear to the context in which the cue and
aversive US are presented. Specifically, Baas (2013) observed that
participants who failed to acquire an awareness of the relationship
between a specific threat cue and the aversive US rated the con-
text in which that stimulus was presented as fearful. Fear ratings
for the context were reduced in participants who acquired the spe-
cific CS–US association (Baas, 2013). However, this study did not
observe trait anxiety to be associated with failure to learn the spe-
cific association, though it is possible that such failure to learn the
specific association may relate to characteristics of anxiety such as
attentional control (Derryberry and Reed, 2002; Baas, 2013).
Individual differences in specificity of learning about cues in
a context may be seen in human contingency learning. Learning
contingencies allows people to make judgments about how accu-
rately events and actions predict subsequent outcomes, allowing
behavior to be guided by experience (Baker et al., 2001). While
positive contingencies, where the probability of an outcome
occurring increases in the presence of a stimulus, are regularly
encountered, we also experience zero contingencies where the
outcome is no more likely to occur in the presence than the
absence of a stimulus. Accuracy in identifying zero contingen-
cies is quite poor, especially when people are asked to consider
whether their actions cause an outcome (Alloy and Abramson,
1979; Baker et al., 2010). Alloy and Abramson (1979) gave partic-
ipants the opportunity to press a light switch and asked them to
estimate howmuch control they had of a light turning on and off.
There was a zero contingency relationship between pressing the
light switch and the light coming on; the light was just as likely to
turn on during trials where the light switch was not pressed as it
was during trials where the light switch was pressed. Alloy and
Abramson (1979) found that depressed participants accurately
judged that they had no control of the light. Non-depressed par-
ticipants incorrectly estimated that they had control of the light.
This effect was termed depressive realism (Alloy and Abramson,
1979). More recent experiments exploring this effect suggest that
depressed participants may be less sensitive to context informa-
tion (Msetfi et al., 2005). In re-running the original Alloy and
Abramson experiment, Msetfi et al. (2005) varied two factors; the
outcome density and the inter-trial interval (ITI). Through this
experimental design the opportunity to press a light switch and
the occurrence, or non-occurrence of the light is split into trials.
The ITI, that is the length of time between each trial, can be var-
ied. Outcome density, that is the proportion of trials on which
outcome occurs, can also be varied while maintaining a zero con-
tingency. For example, in a low outcome density condition the
lightmight turn on during 25% of the trials where the light switch
is pressed and 25% of the trials where the light switch is not
pressed. In a high outcome density condition the light might turn
on during 75% of the trials where the light switch is pressed and
75% of the trials where the light switch is not pressed.
Varying the ITI and outcome density, Msetfi et al. (2005)
observed that the original Depressive Realism effect was only
present when the ITI was long and the outcome density was
high. At shorter ITIs or when the outcome density was lower,
non-depressed participants did not overestimate their control
of the light. Interestingly, in a long ITI design participants
get more exposure to the context in the absence of the out-
come; that is, more experience of no-action (participants can-
not press the light switch during the ITI) and no-outcome
(the light never turns on during the ITI). Increasing exposure
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to the no-action—no-outcome contingency increases the con-
tingency between action and outcome. As such, under these
conditions, non-depressed participants were actually correct in
estimating that they had control over the outcome. The failure
of the depressed participants to increase their judgments of con-
trol suggests that depressed individuals were insensitive to the
no-action—no-outcome information presented during the ITI
(Msetfi et al., 2005; Baker et al., 2010).
LEARNING ABOUT CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OR
CONFIGURATIONS
While linear learning refers to the acquisition and use of associa-
tions between separate stimuli and outcomes, non-linear learning
refers to learning about compound stimuli as distinct config-
urations associated with different outcomes from those asso-
ciated with the compound’s constituent stimuli. The Rescorla
and Wagner (1972) model of elemental learning assumes that
each stimulus is processed separately so that it develops its
own associative link with the outcome. When learning about,
and responding to, compound stimuli, this elemental approach
continues to assume that each individual stimulus develops its
own associative link with the outcome. As such, the model pre-
dicts that the associative strength of a compound stimulus (i.e.,
Vab) is the algebraic sum of the associative strength of each
of the stimuli presented (i.e., Vab = Va + Vb). While elemen-
tal theory naturally accounts for situations where the outcome
following the co-occurrence of stimuli is greater than that follow-
ing the separate constituent stimuli, non-linear discrimination
tasks require the opposite relationship to be learnt; where the
outcome following the co-occurrence of stimuli is less than,
or opposite to, that following the separate constituent stimuli.
Humans and animals can successfully solve non-linear discrim-
inations, such as negative patterning (Redhead and Pearce, 1995;
Shanks and Darby, 1998; Deisig et al., 2001; Myers et al., 2001;
Pearce and George, 2002; Grand and Honey, 2008; Harris et al.,
2008). The traditional Rescorla and Wagner (1972) instantia-
tion of the elemental model cannot account for this. By contrast,
configural theory (Pearce, 1987) can account for non-linear dis-
crimination learning. Configural theory (Pearce, 1987) assumes
that associations form between outcomes and unitary or con-
figural representations of the pattern of stimuli present on a
given trial. As such the configuration present on a compound
trial (AB) should enter into an association with an outcome
independent from the associative links formed between the con-
stituent stimuli and outcomes. Though these two classes of
model make contrasting predictions about how the relation-
ship between constituent stimuli and configurations should be
learnt, there is considerable support for both models, reflect-
ing substantial variability in non-linear learning. (Melchers et al.,
2008).
It has been suggested that the perceptual properties of stimuli
influence whether learning will occur with separate constituent
stimuli (elemental) or configurations (configural; Lachnit, 1988;
Kehoe et al., 1994; Rescorla and Coldwell, 1995; Myers et al.,
2001). Others have argued that these are two separate types of
learning, mediated by different neural substrates (Sutherland and
Rudy, 1989; Fanselow, 1999).
Several studies have looked at whether individuals differ in
their tendency to learn about constituent elements or configu-
rations. The negative patterning discrimination (A+, B+, AB−)
provides a useful test of configural learning, as solving the dis-
crimination requires participants to learn that the compound
stimulus is associated with a different outcome to each of its
constituent stimuli. Shanks and Darby (1998) provided a sug-
gestion that human ability to learn non-linear discriminations,
such as negative patterning, might be dependent upon rule use.
Shanks and Darby (1998) demonstrated that ability to learn a
negative patterning discrimination was associated with later use
of rule as opposed to feature based generalization (Shanks and
Darby, 1998). Rule-based generalization depends on the abstrac-
tion of and generalization from a rule. Feature-based generaliza-
tion depends upon the surface similarity between separate stimuli
and compounds. As such, it is assumed that rule-based general-
ization is more complex and might require greater understanding
of the discrimination (Shanks and Darby, 1998) or more working
memory capacity (Wills et al., 2011).
In the Shanks and Darby (1998) experiment participants were
trained on a negative patterning discrimination (i.e., A+, B+,
AB−) intermixed with trials where separate stimuli were paired
with the outcome (i.e., I+, J+) before being asked for a predic-
tion of the outcome following the co-occurrence of the separately
trained stimuli (i.e., IJ?). Some participants expected the out-
come to occur following the IJ compound, showing feature based
generalization. Others demonstrated application of a negative
patterning rule, expecting no outcome to occur following the IJ
compound. Rule-based generalization was associated with strong
initial discrimination learning (Shanks and Darby, 1998). Wills
et al. (2011) found that individuals who completed a concur-
rent task while learning the same initial discrimination were more
likely to show feature-based generalization (Wills et al., 2011).
As such, it may be that greater working memory capacity is
associated with stronger non-linear discrimination learning and
rule-based generalization. Recently, Baker (2013) observed per-
formance on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, 2000) to
be associated with ability to learn a negative patterning discrim-
ination. Ravens Matrices are designed to assess reasoning ability,
and as such these results may provide support for the suggestion
that rule use facilitates non-linear discrimination learning, such
as negative patterning.
Negative patterning, however, essentially requires learning
about a configuration (that is the co-occurrence of stimuli) inde-
pendently from learning about the constituent stimuli. We may
thus expect that a tendency to perceive or process groups of
stimuli as a unitary configuration, and not simply a cluster of
co-occurring stimuli, may influence performance. Similar task
requirements have been explored in other areas of psychology. For
instance, face recognition is a task thought to be reliant upon con-
figural processing (Diamond and Carey, 1986; Tanaka and Farah,
1993; Leder and Bruce, 2000; Maurer et al., 2002). Strong face
recognition has been associated with a general advantage in global
processing (Macrae and Lewis, 2002; Perfect, 2003); that is, ten-
dency to process global information prior to, or with a higher
priority than, the specific elements composing the global stimuli
(Navon, 1977).
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As individuals differ in their tendency to show a global or local
processing advantage (Navon, 1977), it is possible that such varia-
tion relates to, or influences, capacity to learn about combinations
of stimuli and thus learn a non-linear discrimination. Using
a similar discrimination task to that developed by Shanks and
Darby (1998), Byrom and Murphy (under review) found global
processing to be associated with stronger ability to learn a non-
linear discrimination; specifically, individuals showing a global
processing advantage were better able to discriminate BC from
ABC in a modified negative patterning task (A+, BC+, ABC−).
MODELING INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE IN HUMAN
ASSOCIATIVE LEARNING
Use of associative learning in exploration of clinical phenom-
ena has advanced our understanding of mechanisms underly-
ing cognitive aspects of psychopathology. As psychopathology is
widely accepted to occur along a continuum, the clinical exam-
ples presented here contribute to the demonstration of substantial
individual differences in processes of associative learning. For
instance, though schizophrenia is a serious mental health prob-
lem occurring with a prevalence of around 0.4% (Saha et al.,
2005; McGrath et al., 2008), schizotypy, a dimension reflecting
traits of schizophrenia, varies across the population (Mason et al.,
2005; Mason and Claridge, 2006). Schizotypy is, like schizophre-
nia, associated with disruptions in latent inhibition and blocking
(Moran et al., 2003; Haselgrove and Evans, 2010) as well as
impaired conditional task performance (Haddon et al., 2011) and
impaired visual context processing (Uhlhaas et al., 2004; Uhlhaas
and Silverstein, 2005).
Models of learning may need to account for this flexibility.
If the mechanisms of associative learning vary across the pop-
ulation, focusing on the average performance of a sample when
developing models of learning may result in models which fail to
accurately capture the populations’ performance. Over the years
there have been manymodifications to simple models of learning.
While these modifications allow the models to capture a broader
range of experimental findings, many different factors vary dur-
ing learning and as such it may not be reasonable to search for
a single modification to capture all variability in learning. It is
unlikely that all factors contributing to individual differences in
human associative learning could be captured by one parameter.
Individual differences in many of the factors discussed above
can be captured by varying the parameters present in the Rescorla
and Wagner (1972) model of learning, described in Equation
(1). For instance, if individuals differ in their perception of the
salience of the CS or US, modifying α or β could provide flexibil-
ity to account for this variation. Varyingλ allows accommodation
of individual difference in the rate of learning. Further, it may
be possible to account for individual difference in selectivity of
learning, as observed by Haselgrove and Evans (2010) by varying
the extent to which a separable (i.e., Bush and Mosteller, 1951)
as opposed to a summed (i.e., Rescorla and Wagner, 1972) error
term is adopted. Variation between and integration of summed
and separable error terms and the relation to processes of atten-
tion have been discussed at length elsewhere (Le Pelley, 2004;
Pearce and Mackintosh, 2010).
Individual difference in ability to solve a negative patterning
discrimination, however, is one example of variation that cannot
be accounted for by varying existing parameters in this model. At
least three different approaches have been proposed to allow for
flexibility between elemental and configural models of learning;
the replacement parameter, the discriminability parameter and
the sampling capacity parameter. Each is discussed below.
The Replaced Elements Model (REM; Brandon et al., 2000;
Wagner, 2003), conceives of stimuli as represented by multiple
features or elements. The model focuses on elements that stimuli
share in common and how these elements interact with elements
unique to a given stimulus. In the representation of a compound
there are assumed to be context independent elements which are
activated whenever the stimulus is presented and context depen-
dent elements which are activated or inhibited depending on the
combinations of stimuli presented (Brandon et al., 2000). For
instance, when stimulus A is presented alone, representations of
the elements A1 and A2 may be activated. When stimulus A is
presented in combination with stimulus B, the element A2 may
be replaced by a new element, A3. The model adopts the stipu-
lation that a compound should have no more capacity to elicit
associative strength than any of its constituent elements. As such,
in adding and inhibiting elements, the change made to the ele-
ments represented is qualitative, with the elements represented
being changed, rather than a quantitative.
The replacement parameter r allows flexibility in the pro-
portion of context dependent elements replaced when stimuli
are presented in compound (Wagner, 2003). When r is 0 no
replacement occurs and as such strong generalization of associa-
tive strength between stimuli and compounds is predicted. When
r is 1 there is considerable replacement of elements and as such the
generalization predicted to occur between compounds and con-
stituent stimuli should be reduced. With maximal replacement of
elements, the representation of the compound should be distinct
from the representation of the separate stimuli.
The discriminability parameter, suggested by Kinder and
Lachnit (2003) introduces flexibility into a model of config-
ural learning (Pearce, 1987), allowing the perceived similarity
between stimuli and compounds to be altered. This also affects the
extent to which generalization of associative strength is predicted.
The modification assumes that as it becomes harder to iden-
tify constituent stimuli within compounds, the discriminability
parameter will decrease, reducing the prediction of perceived sim-
ilarity between compounds and constituent stimuli (Kinder and
Lachnit, 2003).
While the replacement and discriminability parameters were
developed to account for the infleunce of external factors such
as stimulus modality (Kehoe et al., 1994), the sampling capacity
parameter was developed to account for individual difference
observed in human associative learning. Sampling capacity here
refers to the number of stimulus features that can be sam-
pled on a given trial. To learn about and respond to the co-
occurrence of stimuli as a distinct combination, Byrom and
Murphy (under review) suggest that features of each of the co-
occurring stimuli must be sampled simultaneously, such that
in any given sample a configuration is represented. Variation
in sampling capacity should produce variation in the extent
to which the features of co-occurring stimuli can be sampled
and as such result in variation in ability to represent and
learn about the distinct combinations of stimuli, required to
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learn a non-linear discrimination. Byrom and Murphy
(under review) suggest that the impact of varying sampling
capacity may be modeled by incorporating a parameter, f, into a
modification of Pearce’s configural model of associative learning.
This parameter reflects the probability of encoding a configura-
tion, calculated from sampling capacity. For a fixed sample size,
the probability of sampling a configuration of a set number of
features increases as sampling capacity increases.
Pearce’s (1987, 1994) configural model of learning stipulates
that associative strength is acquired by the configurations of
stimuli presented (i.e., A, BC, and ABC). However, if individ-
uals have limited sampling capacity, they may learn about the
separate stimuli and not the configurations. To allow for this
flexibility, Byrom and Murphy (under review) suggest modify-
ing Pearce’s (1987, 1994) configural model of learning such that
two sets of nodes may be activated by input; separate stimuli
(i.e., A, B, and C) and presented configurations (i.e., A, BC, and
ABC). Both sets of nodes can form associations with an uncondi-
tioned stimulus and generalization can occur between all nodes.
This can be achieved by modifying Pearce’s (1987, 1994) con-
figural model of associative learning such that changes in the
excitatory strength of the separate stimuli and the presented con-
figurations is moderated by the parameter, f, reflecting sampling
capacity. At a high sampling capacity, the excitatory strength of
presented configurations changes across learning trials. At a low
sampling capacity, the excitatory strength of the separate stimuli
changes across learning trials. As Pearce’s (1987, 1994) configu-
ral model is highly dependent on the influence of generalization,
modification of this model must consider generalization, which,
like change in excitatory strength, comes to be moderated by
the parameter, f. As such, at a high sampling capacity, general-
ization of associative strength to separate stimuli and between
presented configurations will be high, while at a low sampling
capacity generalization of associative strength to separate stimuli
and between presented configurations will be low, but general-
ization from separate stimuli to presented configurations will be
high.
The extent to which parameters can be used to make predic-
tions about learning and behavior in novel situations is dependent
upon ability to specify the parameter a-priori. Each of these
modifications faces challenges in specifying parameters a-priori.
The replacement parameter depends on the proportion of ele-
ments replaced when a stimulus is presented in compound. The
discriminability parameter depends on ability to discriminate
between stimuli. It is possible that either of these parameters
may be calculated for a specific stimulus set, but many factors
would be expected to interact to influence “element replacement”
and stimulus discriminability, limiting the extent to which these
parameters can, in general, be specified a-priori. Sampling capac-
ity may be calculated from individual difference in tendency to
show local or global processing. To do this it is necessary to have
relevant data, such as participants’ performance on a task such as
the Navon task (Navon, 1977).
CONCLUSIONS
Individual difference in human associative learning appears to
have substantial impact upon learning. To accurately understand
and model human associative learning, this flexibility needs to
be accounted for in terms of specific parameters. Though the
introduction of new parameters to increase the flexibility of mod-
els of learning has limitations, exploring the extent to which
variation in specific parameters can account for specific indi-
vidual difference in human associative learning, should enhance
understanding of mechanism of associative learning.
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